RE-DWELL: Definition

Just Transition

Area: Policy and financing

Justice theory is as old as philosophical thought itself, but the contemporary debate often departs from the Rawlsian understanding of justice (Velasquez, Andre, Shanks, & Meyer, 1990). Rawls (1971) argued that societal harmony depends on the extent to which community members believe their political institutions treat them justly. His First Principle of ‘justice as fairness’ relates to equal provision of ‘basic liberties’ to the population. His Second Principle, later referred to as the ‘Difference Principle’, comprises unequal distribution of social and economic goods to the extent that it benefits “the least advantaged” (Rawls, 1971, p. 266).1[1] As this notion added an egalitarian perspective to Rawlsian justice theory, it turned out to be the most controversial element of his work (Estlund, 1996).

The idea of a ‘just transition’ was built on these foundations by McCauley and Heffron (2018), who developed an integrated framework overarching the ‘environmental justice’, ‘climate justice’ and ‘energy justice’ scholarships. The term was first used by trade unions warning for mass redundancies in carbon-intensive industries due to climate policies (Hennebert & Bourque, 2011), but has acquired numerous interpretations since. This is because the major transition of the 21st century, the shift towards a low-carbon society, will be accompanied by large disturbances in the existing social order. In this context, a just transition would ensure equity and justice for those whose livelihoods are most affected (Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). A just transition implies that the ‘least advantaged’ in society are seen, heard, and compensated, which corresponds with three key dimensions conceptualised by Schlosberg (2004): distributive, recognitional, and procedural justice.

Distributive justice corresponds with Rawls’ Difference Principle and comprehends the just allocation of burdens and benefits among stakeholders, ranging from money to risks to capabilities. Recognitional justice is both a condition of justice, as distributive injustice mainly emanates from lacking recognition of different starting positions, as well as a stand-alone component of justice, which includes culturally or symbolically rooted patterns of inequity in representation, interpretation, and communication (Young, 1990). Fraser (1997) stressed the distinction between three forms: cultural domination, nonrecognition (or ‘invisibility’), and disrespect (or ‘stereotyping’). Procedural justice emphasises the importance of engaging various stakeholders – especially the ‘least advantaged’ – in governance, as diversity of perspectives allows for equitable policymaking. Three elements are at the core of this procedural justice (Gillard, Snell, & Bevan, 2017): easily accessible processes, transparent decision-making with possibilities to contest and complete impartiality.

A critique of the just transition discourse is that it preserves an underlying capitalist structure of power imbalance and inequality. Bouzarovski (2022) points to the extensive top- down nature of retrofit programmes such as the Green New Deal, and notes that this may collide with bottom-up forms of housing repair and material intervention. A consensus on the just transition mechanism without debate on its implementation could perpetuate the status quo, and thus neglect ‘diverse knowledges’, ‘plural pathways’ and the ‘inherently political nature of transformations’ (Scoones et al., 2020). However, as Healy and Barry (2017) note, understanding how just transition principles work in practice could benefit the act of ‘equality- proofing’ and ‘democracy-proofing’ decarbonisation decisions.

Essentially, an ‘unjust transition’ in the context of affordable and sustainable housing would refer to low-income households in poorly insulated housing without the means or the autonomy to substantially improve energy efficiency. If fossil fuel prices – either by market forces or regulatory incentives – go up, it aggravates their already difficult financial situation and could even lead to severe health problems (Santamouris et al., 2014). At the same time, grants for renovations and home improvements are poorly targeted and often end up in the hands of higher income ‘free-riding’ households, having regressive distributional impacts across Europe (Schleich, 2019). But even when the strive towards a just transition is omnipresent, practice will come with dilemmas. Von Platten, Mangold, and Mjörnell (2020) argue for instance that while prioritising energy efficiency improvements among low-income households is a commendable policy objective, putting them on ‘the frontline’ of retrofit experiments may also burden them with start-up problems and economic risks.

These challenges only accentuate that shaping a just transition is not an easy task. Therefore, both researchers and policymakers need to enhance their understanding of the social consequences that the transition towards low-carbon housing encompasses. Walker and Day (2012) applied Schlosberg’s dimensions to this context. They conclude that distributive injustice relates to inequality in terms of income, housing and pricing, recognitional justice to unidentified energy needs and vulnerabilities, and procedural injustice to inadequate access to policymaking. Ensuring that the European Renovation Wave is made into a just transition towards affordable and sustainable housing therefore requires an in-depth study into distributive, recognitional and procedural justice. Only then can those intertwining dimensions be addressed in policies.

[1] To illustrate his thesis, he introduces the ‘veil of ignorance’: what if we may redefine the social scheme, but without knowing our own place? Rawls believes that most people, whether from self-interest or not, would envision a society with political rights for all and limited economic and social inequality.

References

Bouzarovski, S. (2022). Just Transitions: A Political Ecology Critique. Antipode. doi:10.1111/anti.12823

Estlund, D. (1996). The Survival of Egalitarian Justice in John Rawls’s Political Liberalism. Journal of Political Philosophy, 4(1), 68-78.

Fraser, N. (1997). Justice interruptus. London: Routledge.

Gillard, R., Snell, C., & Bevan, M. (2017). Advancing an energy justice perspective of fuel poverty: Household vulnerability and domestic retrofit policy in the United Kingdom. Energy Research & Social Science, 29, 53-61. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2017.05.012

Healy, N., & Barry, J. (2017). Politicizing energy justice and energy system transitions: Fossil fuel divestment and a “just transition”. Energy Policy, 108, 451-459. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.06.014

Hennebert, M. A., & Bourque, R. (2011). The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC): Insights from the Second World Congress. Global Labour Journal, 2(2), 154-159.

McCauley, D., & Heffron, R. (2018). Just transition: Integrating climate, energy and environmental justice. Energy Policy, 119, 1-7. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.014

Newell, P., & Mulvaney, D. (2013). The political economy of the ‘just transition’. The Geographical Journal, 179(2), 132-140. doi:10.1111/geoj.12008

Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Santamouris, M., Alevizos, S. M., Aslanoglou, L., Mantzios, D., Milonas, P., Sarelli, I., . . . Paravantis, J. A. (2014). Freezing the poor—Indoor environmental quality in low and very low income households during the winter period in Athens. Energy and Buildings, 70, 61-70. doi:10.1016/j.enbuild.2013.11.074

Schleich, J. (2019). Energy efficient technology adoption in low-income households in the European Union – What is the evidence? Energy Policy, 125, 196-206. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2018.10.061

Schlosberg, D. (2004). Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements And Political Theories. Environmental Politics, 13(3), 517-540. doi:10.1080/0964401042000229025

Scoones, I., Stirling, A., Abrol, D., Atela, J., Charli-Joseph, L., Eakin, H., . . . Yang, L. (2020). Transformations to sustainability: combining structural, systemic and enabling approaches. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 42, 65-75. doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2019.12.004

Velasquez, M., Andre, C., Shanks, T. S. J., & Meyer, M. J. (1990). Justice and fairness. Issues in Ethics, 3(2), 1-3.

Von Platten, J., Mangold, M., & Mjörnell, K. (2020). A matter of metrics? How analysing per capita energy use changes the face of energy efficient housing in Sweden and reveals injustices in the energy transition. Energy Research & Social Science, 70. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2020.101807

Walker, G., & Day, R. (2012). Fuel poverty as injustice: Integrating distribution, recognition and procedure in the struggle for affordable warmth. Energy Policy, 49, 69-75. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.01.044

Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.

Created on 03-06-2022 | Update on 06-06-2022

Related definitions

Housing Governance

Author: T.Croon (ESR11), M.Horvat (ESR6)

Area: Policy and financing

The shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ has been debated since the early 1970s. Whilst state interventionism had been widely embraced within western societies during the post-war decades, governments gradually moved from exercising constitutional powers to acting as facilitators and cooperative partners (Rhodes, 1997). Over the course of a few decades, this resulted in governance as ‘interactive social-political forms of governing’ (Nag, 2018, p. 124). Hira and Cohn (2003, p. 12), influenced by Keohane (2002), define governance as “the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group”. Its decentralised and flexible nature could still include public actors but would also leave space for private and third-sector parties to provide services in hybrid and temporary institutional arrangements. To formulate one single definition of ‘housing governance’ as a particular mode of governance is however difficult due to its multilevel character. Housing could relate to either a family home, a housing association, or a complete local/national housing governance framework. On a household level, Wotschack (2005, p. 2) defines governance as managing “the daily time allocation of spouses by household rules and conflict handling strategies”. The work of Wijburg (2021) indicates that local/municipal governance entails a set of public interventions, strategies, policies and provisions used to provide local needs (e.g. housing supply). On the national level, Yan et al. (2021) define public rental housing (PRH) governance as “a structure of a wide range of government and non-governmental actors that act in all its phases of PRH provision from policy design to implementation and realisation”.[1] This specific definition on PRH combines the domestic definition of governance with Wijburg’s understanding of governance on the local level. Within the Chinese context, the national government provides policies and creates nationwide operational methods, whilst local governments implement and formulate the policies locally (Yan et al., 2021). Critics point out that a more decentralised governance structure complicates the public accountability of housing provision. Peters and Pierre (2006, p. 40) distinguish problems concerning the ‘isolation’ and ‘enforcement’ of accountability. The former refers to demarcation, as it is easier to measure the performance of a government housing agency directly responsible for new build and operations, than those from the private sector in an indirect role trying to stimulate and facilitate other actors and contracting out construction and operations (Shamsul Haque, 2000). The latter relates to the accountability deficit that arises when responsibility is transferred from democratically governed municipal agencies to actors without a representative institutional arrangement, and thus without control mechanisms for tenants or the wider population (Mullins, 2006). Throughout history, understanding of governing has evolved together with the role of government. The state plays a different role in capitalism, corporatism and socialism, which has varying effects on local and/or (inter)national levels. Whilst the above paragraphs describe housing governance within a democratic governance regime, transferring the conceptual debate to autocratic or hybrid regimes would pose difficulties. Thus, finding a unique definition of housing governance applicable in all spheres remains a challenge, and the specific context must be carefully considered. Important challenges remain, and as housing provision mechanisms evolve, further exploration of housing governance, especially on a municipal level, are likely to gain importance (Hoekstra, 2020). [1] “Housing provision is a physical process of creating and transferring a dwelling to its occupiers, its subsequent use and physical reproduction and at the same time, a social process dominated by the economic interests involved” ibid.

Created on 16-02-2022 | Update on 21-02-2022

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Window Guidance

Author: A.Fernandez (ESR12), M.Haffner (Supervisor)

Area: Policy and financing

Window guidance is a credit policy allowing central banks to steer bank lending toward certain economic activities. In the post-war period, it was common for both developed and emerging economies to employ various forms of credit control and allocation. However, these policies were virtually discontinued by the 1980s and the mandate of the central banks was reduced to controlling inflation through interest rates. Housing affordability and sustainability are strongly interlinked with monetary policies, particularly because housing prices and supply rely on debt for financing (Muellbauer, 2018). This link is embodied in inflation-adapted interest rates, which are used by central banks to “cool down” the economy and control prices. Currently, high inflation has pushed central banks all over the world to increase interest rates. Increases in interest rates impact the interbank lending rates such as the Euribor or the Libor and ultimately affect the price of credit in an economy. This then influences in particular capital-intensive industries such as housing development and renovation. Social housing organisations (SHOs) which provide social -thus affordable- rental housing, particularly in North-Western Europe, are dependent on credit to finance not only the provision of housing, but also the energy-efficient renovation of their stock. The rise in interest rates resulting from central banks’ monetary policy aimed at curbing inflation puts the financial viability of renovation and new construction in jeopardy. This insight is not new, as the dependence on credit for renovation and maintenance was already foreseen as an issue in the late 90s by the British housing economist Christine Whitehead (1999). Traditionally, governments support social housing providers through grants, subsidies and through the guaranteeing of their debt (Lawson, 2013). For example, publicly owned social housing providers in Germany have their debt rated equally to that of their main owners: municipalities and regions. As a result, their financing costs also benefit from a high rating implying low-interest rates for their debt. This is also the case in France and the Netherlands where ultimately it is public institutions that guarantee SHO debt. For instance, a Dutch social housing provider raises debt at a triple AAA rating, that of the Dutch state. This lowers their interest costs in comparison to that of other companies which may be rated lower, hence have a higher risk premium and pay more for their debt (Fernández et al., forthcoming). In an inflationary environment, where interest rates rise across the board, this means higher financing costs for SHOs despite their risk premium remaining constant. Window guidance is relevant in this context because it would allow central banks to set a lower interest rate for lending to certain activities, thus creating a window. During the period between 1945-1980, advanced and emerging economies alike implemented interventions on credit and capital markets. Central banks would align lending with industries, exports and manufacturing while increasing interest rates for less desirable sectors (Bezemer et al., 2023; Hodgman, 1973). According to Bezemer et al., (2023) based on Hodgman (1973) and Goodhart (1989 pp. 156–158), ‘credit guidance’, ‘credit controls’, ‘credit ceilings’, ‘directed credit’, and ‘moral suasion’ are also common names for these types of policy. More recently, organisations such as Positive Money have been advocating for a sovereign money proposal where banks would obtain funds from their national central bank with limitations on their usage (Youel, 2022). This enhanced control over bank lending opens up the possibility of earmarking private capital for investment in decarbonisation activities. For example, lending for speculative purposes or for highly polluting activities could be curtailed while the financial viability of environmentally friendly activities could be expanded. Ultimately, credit controls offer the possibility to guide credit toward the provision of affordable and sustainable housing and away from sectors such as fossil fuels or speculative bubbles.

Created on 24-04-2023 | Update on 22-05-2023

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Related case studies

Targeting and Policy Efficiency: Exploring the Intended Reform of the Warm Home Discount

Created on 03-04-2023

While gas prices in Europe have surged since the war in Ukraine started, price volatility was already high before the Russian invasion (Statista, 2022). Furthermore, it is to expected that the low-carbon transition will cause more temporary peaks in residential energy prices (Shi & Shen, 2021). This raises the importance for governments to mitigate the effects on households at risk of fuel poverty, most notably low-income households in poorly insulated homes. There are typically three policy angles (Simshauser, 2021): tariff design, retrofit programmes to improve energy efficiency, and targeted income support or subsidies. This case study explores an innovative proposal within the latter category. Target efficiency of policy In the last decades, governments have moved from universal to more targeted social welfare policies, aiming to ensure their redistributive character in times of austerity (Ortiz & Cummins, 2020). Targeted support is especially important in the context of residential energy affordability because generic measures could reduce the willingness of high-income homeowners to retrofit their homes, and therefore represent perverse incentives. However, targeted policies are by nature imperfect, as it requires balancing between ‘E-mistakes’ (also called ‘leakage’) in which compensation is given to non-targeted groups, and ‘F-mistakes’ (also called ‘under-coverage’) in which part of the targeted group is not given compensation (Cornia & Stewart, 1993). The former is reflected by ‘vertical target efficiency’, the extent to which beneficiaries need compensation, and the latter by ‘horizontal target efficiency’, the extent to which those deemed to need the compensation receive it (Weisbrod, 1972). Moreover, targeting could be problematic when it induces informational distortion, incentive distortion, stigmatisation or significant administrative losses (Sen, 1998). Warm Home Discount Reform In addition to existing income support policies, such as the Cold Weather Payment and the Winter Fuel Payment, the Brittish government introduced the Warm Home Discount (WHD) for England and Wales in 2011. It has offered rebates of up to £140 on annual electricity and gas bills for specific groups: households in receipt of Pension Credit Guarantee form the ‘core group’ and households on various working age benefits the ‘broader group’ (DECC, 2011). While the core group receives the rebate automatically, the broader group must apply for the scheme (with a first-come first-served basis and a total spending envelope of around £350 million) to their energy supplier. In practice, this means that a large share of the eligible group does not know about its entitlement or is refused by suppliers because their spending cap is already exceeded. In addition, the WHD has ever since its announcement been criticised for not reaching all fuel poor households (Consumer Focus, 2011). In response to this criticism, the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) published a consultation document for reform of the WHD (BEIS, 2021). It wants to improve targeting of fuel poor households, automate all rebate payments, and reach more households by raising the spending envelope to £475 million. The proposal to improve and automate targeting is innovative in its current shape: BEIS wants to combine data from public and private organisations to identify households on low incomes living in substandard housing or dealing with high energy costs. It would therefore be the first social welfare benefit that is automatically provided based on a prediction of low energy efficiency, using specific housing characteristics such as floor area, property age and property type as proxies. Narrow focus on vertical efficiency However, in its substantiation of the reform, BEIS seems to interpret target efficiency simply as vertical efficiency, which leads to a neglect of horizontal efficiency effects. BEIS modelling suggests that with the current scheme around 37% of WHD recipients are fuel poor, while the reform would increase this number to 47% of recipients. This reflects the vertical efficiency of the reform, as there would only be 53% ‘leakage’ to the non-targeted group rather than 63%. But arguably of greater importance is the horizontal efficiency, the question what proportion of all fuel poor households in England and Wales would be reached. This percentage remains unknown, leaving the public guessing how much ‘under-coverage’ there would be under the proposed reform. Given the stringent WHD eligibility criteria, my hypothesis would be that under-coverage is high. However, further research is needed to find out whether this is indeed the case, and to explore how setting a different threshold could improve the horizontal efficiency of a future reform. Furthermore, BEIS could think about using a broader understanding of vertical efficiency, not just considering the incidence of fuel poverty, but also the severity on a household level. BEIS now only modelled the proportion of fuel poverty (P0) and not the poverty gap (P1). However, poverty is not a binary phenomenon and should thus not be treated as such. When Hills (2012) was commissioned by the Brittish government to enhance fuel poverty statistics, he introduced the ‘fuel poverty gap’ as an enrichment of the proportion, and envisioned it to be the main driver of policy design. BEIS’ approach in the consultation document demonstrates that this vision has not materialised. Further research could explore whether spending the same amount on a ‘percentage of the utility bill’ rather than a standard discount could lower the fuel poverty gap, as Simshauser (2021) showed for Australian targeted support mechanisms.

T.Croon. ESR11

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The Social Climate Fund: Materialising Just Transition Principles?

Created on 11-07-2023

The EU's Social Climate Fund (SCF) was officially approved by the European Parliament on 18 April 2023 as part of the broader Green Deal initiative, which seeks to expand the scope of the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) to encompass buildings, transport and other sectors. This extension of the ETS is expected to result in increased energy costs and gasoline prices for households and businesses. To assist vulnerable households, micro-enterprises, and transport users in mitigating the financial impact of these price increases, EU Member States may use resources from the SCF to finance various measures and investments. The SCF will primarily be funded through the revenues generated by the new emissions trading system, with a maximum allocation of €65 bn, which will be supplemented by national contributions. Temporarily established for the period of 2026-2032, the fund aims to provide support during this specified timeframe. Preliminary Exploration of Merits and Limitations The initiation of the SCF has received praise from various NGOs advocating for a just transition (WWF, 2022). Supporters highlight its significance in integrating a social dimension into EU climate policies, despite some remaining weaknesses. The SCF’s spending rules are commended for striking a suitable balance between financing structural investments and providing temporary direct income support to vulnerable households. Through the SCF, Member States can finance subsidies that will enable these households to renovate their homes, adopt energy-efficient technologies, and access renewable energy and sustainable transportation. Moreover, various NGOs welcome the requirement for government consultation with subnational administrations and civil society organizations. This could potentially facilitate greater engagement of the target groups in the legislative process. Notably, the SCF also introduces a definition of transport poverty, marking a first in EU policy, and aiding member states to identify those eligible for support (thereby improving recognitional justice). Regarding the aforementioned weaknesses, there is a range of concerns. Firstly, the projected timeline may pose a limitation. Initiating green investments for vulnerable households only a year before the introduction of carbon pricing may not allow sufficient time for the desired impact. Projects related to energy renovation and improved public mobility infrastructure typically require several years to yield tangible results. Additionally, while Member States are required to include consultation with various stakeholders in their national ‘Social Climate Plans’ (SCPs), the level of participation outlined in the proposed regulation is minimalistic, raising concerns about ensuring procedural justice. Perceived Importance of Targeting The legislative text (EU, 2023) underscores the significance of consistent targeting, and Member States are required to furnish comprehensive information regarding the objective of the measure or investment and the specific individuals or groups it aims to address. Additionally, the European Commission expects an elucidation of how the measure or investment will effectively contribute to the accomplishment of the Fund's objectives and its potential to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. Targeting is deemed particularly crucial with regard to direct income support, as universal energy support tends to generate inflationary pressures, encourage unsustainable behaviour, and yield regressive effects. The legislative text states that is crucial to perceive such support as a temporary measure accompanying the decarbonisation of the housing and transport sectors, rather than a permanent solution that fails to address the fundamental causes of energy poverty and transport poverty. Thus, this support should exclusively target the direct consequences of including greenhouse gas emissions from buildings and road transport under the purview of Directive 2003/87/EC, without encompassing electricity or heating costs related to power and heat production covered by the same directive. As stated, "recipients of direct income support should be targeted, as members of a general group of recipients, by measures and investments aimed at effectively lifting those recipients out of energy poverty and transport poverty" (EU, 2023: p.4). The share of the SCF designated for renovation projects should also be specifically directed at the vulnerable households and transport users who are already receiving direct income support. SCPs are allowed to extend support to both public and private entities, including social housing providers and public-private cooperatives, in developing and providing affordable energy efficiency solutions and suitable funding mechanisms that align with the social objectives of the Fund. This support could include ‘financial assistance’ or even ‘fiscal incentives’, which poses the question of how lenient should the approach of the European Commission be towards the state support of social housing organisations, given the tensions that have emerged in the past (Gruis & Elsinga, 2014). Ex Ante and Ex Post Assessment of Social Climate Plans EU Member States are required to submit national Social Climate Plans (SCPs) no later than 30 June 2025, so that they can be given “careful and timely consideration”. The plans should encompass an investment component that promotes the long-term solution of reducing reliance on fossil fuels, potentially incorporating additional measures, such as temporary direct income support, to alleviate any immediate adverse effects on income. The primary objectives of these plans must be twofold. Firstly, they should provide vulnerable households, vulnerable micro-enterprises, and vulnerable transport users with the necessary resources to enable them to finance and undertake investments in energy efficiency, the decarbonisation of heating and cooling systems, the adoption of zero- and low-emission vehicles, and sustainable mobility. This support may be provided through mechanisms such as vouchers, subsidies, or zero-interest loans. Secondly, the plans should mitigate the impact of rising fossil fuel costs on the most vulnerable segments of society, thus fighting energy poverty and transport poverty during the transitional phase until the aforementioned investments have been implemented. The legislative text contains comprehensive information concerning the criteria utilised to assess the SCPs upon submission and evaluation after implementation. The set of ‘result indicators’ that are specifically relevant to the 'building sector' can be found in the table accompanying this case study. Time will tell whether this framework is sufficient to ensure that besides ‘recognitional justice’ and ‘procedural justice’, the SCF will make sure that the European Green Deal delivers ‘distributive justice’.

T.Croon. ESR11

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